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I. INTRODUCTION
ON 7 March 2014 at 16:41:43Z1, Malaysian Airlines flightMH370 departed Kuala Lumpur (KL) International Air-
port bound for Beijing. Less than an hour later, following the
last recorded radio transmission from MH370 at 17:19:30Z,
the plane’s secondary radar transponder went offline. As
evidenced by Malaysian military radar, the plane (registration
number 9M-MRO) then veered off course unexpectedly, back-
tracked across the Malaysian Peninsula, and was then tracked
heading northwest from Penang through the Malacca Straits.
After disappearing from radar at 18:22:12Z, it re-established
a satellite communications (SATCOM) link with the Inmarsat
satellite I-3F1 at 18:25:27Z. By analyzing a series of auto-
mated messages exchanged via that satellite between the plane
and an Inmarsat ground station in Perth, Australia, it was
determined that the plane continued to fly for six hours, before
finally ceasing message exchange with the ground station at
00:19:37Z on 8 March 2014. This article discusses specifically
the analysis of burst frequency offset (BFO) metadata from the
SATCOM messages. Importantly, it is shown that the BFOs
corresponding to the last two SATCOM messages from the
plane at 00:19:29Z and 00:19:37Z suggest that flight MH370
was rapidly descending and accelerating downwards when
message exchange with the ground station ceased.
An initial analysis by Inmarsat of the SATCOM metadata
for MH370 in the last six hours of flight suggested that
MH370 had flown into the Southern Indian Ocean before
SATCOM was ultimately lost (see [1] for further details). As
summarized in [2] an intensive aerial and surface search was
undertaken in the Southern Indian Ocean by an international
search team during March and April 2014, with no MH370
related debris found. On 28 April 2014, the aerial search
concluded and the search transitioned to an underwater phase
[2]. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) took
responsibility for the definition of the underwater search zone.
It convened an international flight path prediction working
group bringing together experts in satellite communications,
statistical data processing and aviation, in order to estimate the
most likely final location of flight MH370. The group consisted
of representatives from the Australian Defence Science and
Technology (DST) Group and the other organizations listed in
the Acknowledgment section of this article.
New methods of analyzing the Inmarsat data were de-
veloped by the group, resulting in the release of reports
Copyright c© 2018 Commonwealth of Australia.
1All times given in this article are in UTC or “Zulu” time, denoted by “Z”.
concerning the likely final location of flight MH370 from the
ATSB in August 2014 [3], October 2014 [4], and December
2015 [5]. Inmarsat also published an article regarding their
contribution to the flight path reconstruction effort [1]. The
DST Group contribution that assisted in the definition of an
extended priority search area in December 2015 [5] has been
detailed in [2]. This demonstrated how Bayesian analysis was
used to identify a high probability region of where the plane
was believed to be at the time of last SATCOM transmission
(00:19:37Z 8 March 2014). The DST Group Bayesian method
used a prior probability distribution defined by the Malaysian
military radar, a likelihood function describing the relationship
between SATCOM measurements and the aircraft position and
velocity during the flight, and a model of the aircraft dynamics.
It should be noted that this article does not cover the
Bayesian method used in defining the underwater search area.
For details on that method, the reader is referred to [2]. Instead,
this article focuses on:
1) A brief review of the statistical analysis of BFOs for
several previous flights of 9M-MRO.
2) Examination of the effects of the plane’s vertical velocity
on the BFO.
3) An analysis of the effect of the track angle of the plane
on the BFO towards the end-of-flight.
4) The establishment of a BFO trend throughout the last 6
hours of flight so as to determine an expected BFO at
end-of-flight.
5) An analysis of the behavior of the frequency oscillator in
the plane’s satellite data unit (SDU) after power outage
events such as those believed to have occurred twice
during flight MH370, and how this affects the BFO.
6) An analysis that shows that the final two BFO’s are
consistent with MH370 being in a rapid descent and
accelerating downwards.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows.
Section II presents a brief timeline of key events during
the MH370 accident flight. In Section III, a review of the
SATCOM model is provided, along with a brief review of the
BFO statistics. This serves as a summary of work previously
presented in [2]. Section IV describes the effects of aircraft
position and velocity on the BFO. The settling behavior of
the SDU’s frequency oscillator for 9M-MRO after power-up is
then detailed in Section V. This is important because the SDU
is believed to have undergone a power outage between 00:11Z
and 00:19Z on 8 Mar 2014, immediately preceding the last two
SATCOM transmissions from MH370. The effect of oscillator
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2Fig. 1. System model of the satellite communication system [2].
warm-up on the BFO after power-up can be used in bounding
the descent rates for MH370 at 00:19:29Z and 00:19:37Z. In
Section VI an analysis of the descent rate of MH370 based
on the last two BFO values is presented. This analysis derives
lower and upper bounds on the descent rate at 00:19:29Z and
00:19:37Z. Conclusions are presented in Section VII.
II. TIMELINE OF EVENTS DURING THE ACCIDENT FLIGHT
A comprehensive description of the events occurring during
the MH370 accident flight is provided in [6]. A summary of
salient events to this article is provided in Table I.
III. REVIEW OF SATCOM MODEL
The accident aircraft was fitted with a SATCOM terminal
that used the Inmarsat Classic Aero system [1], which uses
geosynchronous satellites to relay messages between aircraft
and ground stations. During the flight, messages were passed
between the aircraft and a ground receiving station located
in Perth, Australia, via the Inmarsat-3F1 satellite. Figure 1
illustrates the SATCOM system in use during the flight. The
aircraft is referred to as the Aircraft Earth Station (AES) and
the ground receiving unit is referred to as the Ground Earth
Station (GES). Inmarsat-3F1 is a satellite in geosynchronous
orbit at 64.5◦ East longitude and it was used exclusively for
the duration of the flight.
An AES is equipped with an SDU comprising a satellite
modem with auxiliary hardware and software. Transmission
of data over the satellite is via bursts which are sched-
uled to arrive at the GES at a specified time and a given
frequency. As explained in [2], [1], communications from
multiple users are coordinated by the allocation of different
time and frequency slots to each user. This is done without
knowledge of individual AES locations or precise knowledge
of the satellite location. Therefore, messages from a given AES
might not arrive at the GES at exactly the expected time, and
generally would arrive slightly later. The difference between
the expected time of arrival (based on a nominal assumed
position for the satellite and the AES) and the actual time of
arrival is referred to as the Burst Timing Offset (BTO). The
BTO is a measure of how far the aircraft is from the sub-
satellite position2.
The relative velocity between the satellite and the AES, as
well as between the satellite and the GES, leads to a Doppler
frequency offset on the signals received at the GES. Coupled
with small frequency offsets inherent in the reference fre-
quency oscillators in the AES, satellite and GES, this results in
a net difference between the expected and actual frequency of
the signal presented to the modem in the GES for a given user.
Frequency compensations applied onboard the aircraft (aircraft
induced Doppler pre-compensation) and at the ground station
(Enhanced Automatic Frequency Correction, which utilizes the
reference signal transmitted from a reference station in Burum,
Netherlands), [2], [1] serve to reduce the possible difference
between the expected and actual frequency of the messages
received from the aircraft. The residual difference between
the expected frequency of each communications burst and the
actual received frequency is referred to as the BFO.
A. Review of BFO Statistics
Based on 20 previous flights of 9M-MRO in the week
leading up to the accident flight (see [2] for further details),
a histogram was produced for the difference between the
predicted BFO (based on known details of the plane and
the satellite’s position and velocity) and the measured BFO
(based on Inmarsat ground station logs). This difference (i.e.
predicted minus measured) is referred to as the BFO error. The
histogram of the BFO error is shown in Fig. 2, along with a
Gaussian distribution fit line. It can be seen that the distribution
is somewhat Gaussian. The standard deviation of the BFO
error was found in [2] to be 4.3 Hz. Whilst it is reasonable to
apply bounds on the possible BFO error based on ±3 standard
deviations as was done for the approximate analysis described
in [7], for the purpose of the descent analysis presented later
in Sec. VI, it is assumed the BFO error is strictly bounded on
the larger interval [−28,+18] Hz, which corresponds to the
bounds of all 2501 observed valid3 in-flight BFO error values
available from the preceding 20 flights of 9M-MRO.
IV. EFFECTS OF AIRCRAFT POSITION AND VELOCITY ON
THE BURST FREQUENCY OFFSET
A. Mathematical Description of the BFO
In [2], the BFO is defined mathematically at time step k
as the sum of a noiseless component hBFOk and a scalar w
BFO
k
that represents the BFO noise. The noiseless component of the
BFO is defined in [2] as the sum:
hBFOk (xk, sk) = ∆F
up
k (xk, sk) + ∆F
down
k (sk)
+δf compk (xk) + δf
sat
k (sk)
+δfAFCk (sk) + δf
bias
k (xk, sk) , (1)
where
• xk denotes the state vector of the aircraft;
• sk denotes the state vector of the satellite;
2The sub-satellite position is the point on the earth directly below the
satellite.
3One outlier was removed as explained in Sec. V.
3TABLE I
TIMELINE OF EVENTS DURING MH370
Date and Timestamp(s) Description Comments
7 Mar. 2014 16:42Z MH370 departs Kuala Lumpa Airport Normal take-off
Last ACARS transmission 7 Mar. 2014 17:07Z Everything normal, on path to Beijing
Loss of secondary radar 7 Mar. 2014 17:21:13Z Onboard transponder goes inactive; last civilian radar
7 Mar. 2014 18:22:12Z Last Malaysian military radar contact MH370 shown tracking NW through Malacca Straits
7 Mar. 2014 18:25Z-18:28Z Satellite Data Unit (SDU) log-on sequence If flying level, MH370 still tracking NW
7 Mar. 2014 18:39-18:41Z Unanswered ground-to-air phone call If flying level, MH370 tracking southwards
7 Mar. 2014 19:41Z to 8 Mar. 2014 00:11Z SATCOM metadata approx. hourly from MH370 [1], [2] suggest flight into Southern Indian Ocean
8 Mar. 2014 00:19:29Z-00:19:37Z Partial SDU log-on sequence Implies rapid descent
Fig. 2. Histogram of BFO errors for 20 flights of 9M-MRO prior to MH370
(reproduced from Fig. 5.5 of [2]). The mean and standard deviation for the
distribution are 0.18 Hz and 4.3 Hz, respectively [2].
• ∆F upk (xk, sk) is the uplink (aircraft to satellite) Doppler
shift;
• ∆F downk (sk) is the downlink (satellite to ground station)
Doppler shift;
• δf compk (xk) is the frequency compensation applied by the
aircraft;
• δf satk (sk) is the variation in satellite translation fre-
quency;
• δfAFCk (sk) is the frequency compensation applied by the
ground station receive chain;
• δfbiask (xk, sk) is a slowly varying bias due to errors in
the aircraft and satellite oscillators and processing in the
SDU.
By treating the bias δfbiask (xk, sk) as a constant determined
at the source tarmac for any particular flight, as was done in
[2] for MH370, any small time-varying component of the bias
during a particular flight can be considered as part of the BFO
noise (indeed this was done when compiling the results used
to obtain the BFO error histogram shown in Fig. 2). Details
regarding the terms δf satk (sk) and δf
AFC
k (sk) are provided
in [1]. Tabulated values of the sum of these two terms were
provided by Inmarsat to the MH370 Flight Path Reconstruction
Group to use in estimating the likely trajectory flown. These
two terms depend on the satellite state sk only, and not
on the aircraft state xk. Moreover, the downlink Doppler
∆F downk (sk) does not depend on the location or velocity of
the aircraft, and can be calculated given the known frequency
of the downlink and the known satellite state at any given
time.
Equation (1) can be then be simplified to:
hBFOk (xk, sk) = ∆F
up
k (xk, sk) + δf
comp
k (xk) + δf
det
k (sk) ,
(2)
where δfdetk (sk) is effectively a known deterministic value for
any time step k. The other terms in (2) couple the aircraft state
xk by way of the aircraft position and velocity to the BFO as
per the following equations adapted from [2]4:
∆F upk (xk, sk) =
F up
c
(vs − vx)T (px − ps)
|px − ps| , (3)
δf compk (xk) =
F up
c
(vˆx)
T
(pˆx − pˆs)
|pˆx − pˆs| , (4)
where the dependence on the time step k on the right hand side
of the equations has been removed for simplicity of notation.
In equations (3) and (4), |·| is the three dimensional Cartesian
distance, and:
• F up is the uplink carrier frequency;
• c is the speed of light;
• vs is the velocity vector of the satellite;
• vx is the velocity vector of the plane;
• ps is the position vector of the satellite;
• px is the position vector of the plane;
• vˆx is the SDU’s estimate of the plane’s velocity vector,
which is obtained using the plane’s track angle and
ground speed, whilst assuming the vertical speed is zero;
• pˆs is the SDU’s estimate of the position vector of the
satellite, which assumes the satellite is at its nominal
orbital slot of 0 degrees North and 64.5 degrees East;
• pˆx is the SDU’s estimate of the position vector of the
plane, which is obtained using the plane’s latitude and
longitude, whilst assuming the plane is at sea level.
B. Effect of uncompensated vertical velocity
The vertical speed of the plane is not used in the SDU
Doppler compensation. As such, there is a direct contribution
4Note that the sign convention used in [2] is opposite to that used in (3)
4of Doppler due to the proportion of the vertical velocity vector
projected onto the radial direction from the aircraft to the
satellite. It is straightforward to understand that if the plane
was directly below the satellite, the vertical velocity vector
would be fully towards or away from the satellite if the plane
was climbing or descending. The direct contribution of the
Doppler to the BFO in that case would be governed by the
following standard Doppler equation.
∆F upk (xk, sk) =
vz · F up
c
, (5)
where F up and c are as previously defined, and vz is the
vertical speed of the plane. Substituting an uplink frequency
of 1646.6525 MHz (the uplink frequency stated in [1]) and
a vertical velocity of 100 feet per minute (fpm), equivalent
to 0.508 meters per second, equation (5) implies that the
predicted BFO would increase by 2.8 Hz per 100 fpm of climb
rate or decrease by 2.8 Hz per 100 fpm of descent rate if the
plane were directly below the satellite. This is the maximum
possible contribution of the plane’s climb or descent rate to
the BFO. In the more general case, equation (5) is moderated
by the sine of the elevation angle θ from the aircraft to the
satellite. This is expressed as
∆F upk (xk, sk) =
vz · F up sin(θ)
c
. (6)
As such, at 00:19Z (the time at which the plane crosses the 7th
arc provided by Fig. 3)5, where the elevation to the satellite is
38.8 degrees, the contribution to the BFO of climb or descent
rate is reduced to approximately +1.7 Hz or −1.7 Hz per
100 fpm respectively.
C. Effect of track angle on BFO towards end-of-flight
Another factor that needs to be considered in interpreting
the BFOs at 00:19Z is the track angle of the aircraft. In
[2], Fig. 5.6, a set of curves were shown illustrating the
relationship of the BFO error and the aircraft track angle at
18:39Z. That was done to illustrate that under the assumption
of level flight during the unanswered telephone call period
of 18:39Z-18:41Z, MH370 would have been tracking in a
southerly direction. The same model can be used to examine
the relationship between the BFO error and the track angle
at 00:11Z, when MH370 crossed the 6th arc, just 8 minutes
prior to the last messages were received from MH370.6 To
generate the curve of BFO error vs. track angle, it is assumed
that the aircraft crossed this arc at 38.67S, 85.11E. A previous
sensitivity analysis has revealed the curve is relatively insen-
sitive to the actual crossing point. Also, calculations revealed
that (as shown in Fig. 5.6 of [2] at 18:40Z) the track angle
of the aircraft influences the BFO to a greater degree for a
faster assumed ground speed. To assess the maximum possible
effect of track angle on the BFO at 00:19Z, a ground speed of
500 kts is assumed, and the BFO error vs. track angle is then
5The arcs referred to in this paper and other MH370 literature are segments
of the rings in Fig. 3.
6Note that the 6th arc crossing is considered here to isolate effects of ground
track angle variation as opposed to vertical velocity, since the measured BFO
at the 6th arc is still consistent with level flight.
Fig. 3. BTO rings during the MH370 flight [3]. Note that the latitude of the
arrows shown for each ring is arbitrary.
Fig. 4. BFO errors as a function of track angle at 00:11Z.
as shown in Fig. 4. Another curve assuming 450 kts ground
speed is shown for comparative purposes. It is noted that the
peak-to-peak variation of the BFO difference is similar for
both considered ground-speeds.
D. BFO Trend During the MH370 Flight
The measured BFOs from 19:41Z to 00:11Z are shown in
Fig. 5 together with a line-of-best-fit. This line is extended
forward to the time of the 00:19Z log-on resulting in an
expected BFO of roughly 254 Hz7. With reference to the track
angle curves presented in Fig. 4, the 00:11Z BFO error value
for the southern-most track is roughly 6 Hz, meaning the
measured BFO of 252 Hz was 6 Hz lower than the lowest
value it could have been (assuming roughly level flight at
7Note the BFOs observed at 00:19Z were much lower than the expected
value.
5Fig. 5. Measured BFOs during the MH370 flight with trend-line extrapolated
back to 18:40Z and forward to 00:19Z.
approximately 450 kts). If we assume the same error value
at 00:19Z, and use the extrapolated BFO, assuming a south
track with level flight and similar ground speed, the expected
BFO value is 260 Hz.
The linear trend-line in Fig. 5 is also extended back by
1 hour to the time of the first unanswered satellite telephone
call to MH370. The mean of the measured BFOs during that
call attempt is also shown. Since the mean of the measured
BFOs from the 18:39-18:41Z call attempt are in broad agree-
ment with the linear trend observed in the BFOs from 19:41Z
to 00:11Z (for which the BTOs themselves were consistent
with straight and level flight [2]), this supports the finding
in [2] that there were most-likely no major turns after the
unanswered call attempt (see ([2], Fig. 10.5)).
V. EFFECT OF SDU STARTUP ON THE BFO
The BFOs logged for messages from the plane received at
the Perth GES at 00:19:29Z and 00:19:37Z 8 March 2014
were much lower than the expected value of 260 Hz. In the
absence of any other factors affecting the BFOs at these times,
this suggests a large uncompensated negative vertical velocity
component in the BFOs. In determining how to interpret this
data, it is important therefore to carefully consider any known
other factors that could effect these BFOs. One potential factor
is an SDU oscillator startup transient. This section analyses
the range of expected effect on the BFO caused by a period
of power outage followed by a restart of the SDU, as was a
possibility between 00:11Z and 00:19Z on 8 March 2014 (see
[3] for further details).
A. Detailed Analysis of SDU Startup Effects on the BFO
At 18:25:27Z 7 March 2014, the Inmarsat GES in Perth
received a SATCOM log-on request from 9M-MRO. A series
of messages were exchanged in the following few minutes
Fig. 6. Measured BFOs following the 18:25:27Z log-on message from
MH370.
as part of a standard log-on sequence. The BFOs over those
minutes displayed somewhat unusual behavior in that (barring
the first BFO) the BFO appeared to be exhibiting a transient
settling behavior. This is shown in Fig. 6. It was noted in
[1] that the spike in BFO observed at this time8 was not
fully understood and whilst originally attributed to a possible
aircraft maneuver it could also be related to actual frequency
changes occurring during the logon sequence. A subsequent
study [8] by the SATCOM sub-group of the MH370 Flight
Path Reconstruction Group revealed this was most likely due
to power-on frequency drift and subsequent stabilization of
the oven-controlled crystal oscillator (OCXO) in the SDU. In
[8], a number of different SDUs were tested to investigate the
effects of power outages on the BFO during SDU power on,
triggering a SATCOM logon such as that which occurred for
MH370 at 18:25:27Z. It was found that whilst the frequency
settling behavior was different for each individual SDU, any
given SDU displayed repeatable behavior for a fixed outage
duration, and similar settling characteristics for outages of
different duration.
Based on sequences of Inmarsat BFO logs for 9M-MRO
concerning four log-ons after periods of SATCOM outage in
the week leading up to the accident flight, it was found (in [8])
that the SDU in 9M-MRO resulted in a BFO that was initially
too high at the time of log-on, followed by a simple decay
over the next few minutes to a steady-state value. Regarding
the log-on event at 18:25:27Z for MH370, it was noted that
there was a non-zero bit error rate (BER) associated with the
log-on request at that time. The associated received signal level
and carrier-to-noise density ratio (C/N0) were also unusually
low. As such, the first BFO was deemed untrustworthy.9 Note
that this is not the only time such a behavior was observed
for the SDU in 9M-MRO. In the analysis of BFOs presented
in [2], there was an outlier in the BFO (with an error of
8When viewed on a time-scale of hours as shown in Fig. 9 of [1], this
behavior looks like a spike in BFO between 18:25Z and 18:28Z.
9An alternative explanation for this outlier BFO could be the unknown
conditions of the aircraft between 17:22Z and 18:25Z, for instance the
temperature of the SDU might have been much lower than the expected
ambient temperature.
6-170 Hz) found to have occurred for a SATCOM message
associated with 9M-MRO in one of the 20 previous flights of
9M-MRO. This was discarded as an outlier and not presented
in [2]. It too had a non-zero BER and a low C/N0 (37.6 dBHz
compared to surrounding values between 41.5 and 42 dBHz).
With the removal of the untrustworthy BFO logged for the first
message in the sequence shown in Fig. 6, the 18:25Z log-on
from MH370 was also determined to follow the simple decay
trend observed in other instances.
It was noted by DST Group that if the simple BFO decay
trend established after SDU power-up [8] also occurred during
the MH370 SATCOM log-on event beginning at 00:19:29Z,
then it would allow bounds to be established on the BFO that
would have been expected for MH370 if the plane was flying
level at that time. This in turn would allow the determination
of bounds on the possible descent rates of MH370 during
that final log-on event. In order to build confidence that the
simple BFO decay trend would hold for the 00:19Z log-on
event, DST Group reviewed additional Inmarsat logs for 9M-
MRO, corresponding to the period 22 February to 28 February
2014. Two additional cases were identified in which 9M-
MRO logged back onto an Inmarsat satellite after a sustained
period of SATCOM outage. The sequence of BFOs observed
in these two cases, along with the five already considered by
the SATCOM working group in [8], are shown in Fig. 7, and
details about each of the log-ons are given in Table II.
The periods of SATCOM outages followed by log-on events
were identified from Inmarsat-provided ground-station logs by
identifying sequences of three or more unsuccessful log-on
interrogations to 9M-MRO (suggesting the SDU was likely
powered off) followed by a log-on to the satellite system
initiated from 9M-MRO at some later time. The exact duration
of the power-off period for the SDU was unable to be
determined from the logs, however the timestamps associated
with the unsuccessful log-on interrogations and subsequent
9M-MRO initiated log-ons were used to determine bounds on
the outage time as shown in the 3rd column of Table II.10
Additional comments about each log-on sequence are given
in the final column. Whilst some of the BERs for log-ons 1
and 6 were non-zero, the BFOs did not appear to be outliers,
and were therefore considered valid. The uncertainty window
in the length of the outage durations shown is roughly 60
minutes; this relates to timers in the Inmarsat satellite ground
stations that result in a log-on interrogation being sent to the
plane after roughly 60 minutes of SATCOM inactivity. Indeed,
it is this same timing responsible for the roughly 60 minute
separation between the four BTO arcs from 19:41Z to 22:41Z
(e.g. [3], [1]). It is also of note that based on other evidence
related to MH370 (e.g. secondary radar transponder loss of
signal at 17:22Z) that SDU power was probably first lost at
17:22Z, in which case the SDU power outage duration for
log-on 7 would be approximately 63 minutes.
For log-ons 3 and 5, there were some points available about
half an hour after the log-on in each case (noting the plane was
10Note that the bounds shown are derived under the assumption that the
SATCOM outage was exclusively due to a power outage. It is also possible
that the first part of some outages was due to a blocked line of sight to the
Inmarsat satellites.
Fig. 7. Measured BFOs for 7 log-ons of 9M-MRO.
on the tarmac for the whole time) that demonstrate the BFO
appears to have fully settled to a steady-state value. Log-ons 1
to 5 only lasted for less than 1 minute after the log-on request
message. The results for log-ons 6 and 7, which had log-on
sequences lasting a few minutes suggest a settling behavior
of approximately 3 minutes duration. For all observed log-on
sequences, there seems to be a simple decay of BFO over a
few minutes after SDU startup and log-on request (see also
Fig. 8). It is therefore possible a similar decay was occurring
during the SDU log-on sequence beginning at 00:19:29Z.
In order to establish what the likely range of steady-state
equivalent BFOs would have been at 00:19Z, it is useful to
re-plot the curves from Fig. 7 translated vertically such that
the log-on acknowledgment has 0 Hz offset. This is done in
Fig. 8, which has also been zoomed in the time-axis for clarity.
For log-ons 1 to 6, the aircraft was on the ground at
an airport. It has been established that the most common
scenario for an on-ground-at-airport log-on after sustained
power outage of the SDU is for the AES to use a different self-
Doppler compensation method than was in use for log-on 7
and the log-on at 00:19Z. This is due to a lack of navigational
input data from the aircraft’s inertial navigation unit in the few
minutes after power-up, and is referred to as the closed-loop
Doppler compensation approach.11
The standard AES Doppler compensation mode when nav-
igational data is available to the SDU is the mode used for
log-on 7 and the log-on at 00:19Z. This approach was briefly
described in Sec. IV-A. It used the aircraft’s own estimates of
its position and horizontal velocity to predict and correct the
AES contributed Doppler shift. This is referred to as open-loop
Doppler compensation.
For log-ons 1 to 6, we work on the premise that closed-loop
Doppler compensation was used.12 In that approach, the fre-
quency of broadcast P-channel transmissions received by 9M-
11The use of closed-loop Doppler compensation in this circumstance
was established in consultation with members of the MH370 Flight Path
Reconstruction Group, including representatives from Thales and Inmarsat.
12Previous analysis had not considered the difference in Doppler compen-
sation mode, yet still resulted in similar descent rates to those presented in
this paper.
7TABLE II
DETAILS OF LOG-ON SEQUENCES USED FOR ANALYSIS
Identifier Date and Timestamp of Log-on Duration of Preceding Power Outage Any Other Comments
Log-on 1 23rd Feb. 23:57Z Between 381 and 442 minutes After scheduled A1 maintenance check, some non-zero BERs
Log-on 2 26th Feb. 14:11Z Between 295 and 354 minutes
Log-on 3 5th Mar. 03:06Z Between 35 and 95 minutes
Log-on 4 6th Mar. 13:29Z Between 43 and 103 minutes
Log-on 5 6th Mar. 15:02Z Between 35 and 92 minutes
Log-on 6 7th Mar. 12:50Z Between 228 and 288 minutes Some non-zero BERs
Log-on 7 7th Mar. 18:25Z Between 20 and 78 minutes First point untrustworthy
Fig. 8. Decay in measured BFOs for 7 log-ons of 9M-MRO. The decay rates
for log-ons 1 to 6 have been adjusted to account for the different AES Doppler
compensation mode used during these log-ons.
MRO were used to determine the AES Doppler contribution.
In this approach, all of the difference between the received
and expected P-channel frequency is attributed by the SDU to
be caused by AES motion induced Doppler. As such, if the
OCXO frequency is higher than its nominal settled value, due
to incomplete temperature stabilization, the received frequency
will appear lower than expected by the corresponding amount.
When applying the AES Doppler compensation in this case,
the transmit frequency is increased by the difference between
the stable and pre-stabilized oscillator frequency (scaled to
account for the difference between P-channel frequency and
the R-channel transmit frequency). Moreover, the transmit
frequency itself (prior to AES Doppler compensation) will
already be too high by the same amount due to the incomplete
temperature stabilization. The net combined effect to the BFO
decay observed due the OCXO settling will therefore be dou-
bled compared to the case where open-loop AES Doppler pre-
compensation is used. Hence, the BFO decay results for log-
ons 1 to 6 shown in Fig. 8 have been halved for the analysis
when compared to those inferred from the raw measured BFOs
presented in Fig. 7.
Recall that the two messages at 00:19:29Z and 00:19:37Z
are a log-on and log-on acknowledgment respectively. From
the data used to plot Fig. 8, it can be determined that the
log-on acknowledgment BFOs are in the range of [0,6] Hz
lower than the log-on BFOs. Also the maximum difference
between the log-on BFO and the settled BFO value is in the
range [17,136] Hz. The only log-on that doesn’t appear to be
approaching a settled value in this range is log-on 1, for which
it is anticipated that if more data points were available several
minutes later, as was the case for log-ons 3, 5, 6 and 7, the
settling behavior would be similar to that for log-ons 6 and 7,
bearing in mind the outage duration for log-on 1 is probably at
least 381 minutes, and the BFO already dropped substantially
in the first 30 seconds after log-on.
B. Summary of SDU Startup Effects on the BFO
It is likely that the SDU in 9M-MRO lost power sometime
after 00:11Z, and then regained power (presumably due to
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) startup) prior to 00:19Z, leading
to the SDU making the log-on attempt at 00:19:29Z. Previous
such events for 9M-MRO have shown that this results in an
initially too-high BFO for the log-on message, followed by a
simple decay characteristic to reach a steady-state BFO after
several minutes. In order to establish the relevance of the BFOs
at 00:19:29Z and 00:19:37Z to the motion (including descent
rate) of MH370 at those times, this section has established
bounds for the likely range of steady-state equivalent BFOs
at those times. This was done by analyzing BFOs from seven
previous SDU start-up events for a period of several minutes.
The specific results obtained suggest that:
1) The recorded BFO for the 00:19:29Z log-on was be-
tween 17 and 136 Hz higher than it would have been
if the OCXO in the SDU was in a steady state at that
time;
2) The recorded BFO for the 00:19:37Z log-on acknowl-
edge message was between 17 and 130 Hz higher than
it would have been if the OCXO in the SDU was in a
steady state at that time.
VI. BOUNDING THE DESCENT RATES OF MH370
The results from Sections IV and V can be combined to
provide bounds on the descent rate of MH370 implied by the
BFOs from the two last SATCOM messages for the flight. In
this section, it is shown how this is done for two different
possibilities that could explain the attempted SATCOM log-
on from 9M-MRO at 00:19Z. In [3] the most likely cause
of this log-on was stated to be a power interruption resulting
from insufficient fuel and subsequent engine flameout. It could
8also have been due to a temporary software failure, a loss of
systems providing critical input to the SDU, or a loss of the
SATCOM link due to aircraft attitude being such that the line-
of-sight to the satellite is blocked. If it was indeed a power
interruption to the SDU caused by loss of fuel and subsequent
reboot using the APU, the SDU would be without power for
about one minute. In this case, the results of Sec. V-B need
to be considered when interpreting the last two BFOs.13 If
on the other hand, the power loss was momentary (resulting
in a reset of the SDU) or if the temporary SATCOM outage
leading to the log-on request was due to one of the other listed
reasons, there would be no “warm-up drift” to consider, so the
results of Sec. V would not need to be applied. Both cases are
considered separately in the following two sub-sections, and
then combined overall bounds are presented.
A. Hypothesis 1: SATCOM outage due to insufficient fuel
In the event that the SDU log-on at 00:19:29Z was due
to engine flame-out, followed by a restart of the SDU using
power from the APU, the SDU outage preceding the log-on
would have lasted about one minute. This would result in some
cooling of the OCXO in the SDU. The likely effect of the
SDU startup and consequent ‘warm-up drift’ of the OCXO is
summarized in Sec. V-B. Table III presents the recorded BFOs
and bounds on the adjusted BFOs to remove these effects of
warm-up drift. In the last column of the table, the bounds
are extended taking into account the BFO noise bounds of
[−28,+18] Hz established in Sec. III-A.
As established in Sec. IV-B, the recorded BFO would be
roughly 1.7 Hz lower for every 100 fpm of descent rate. As
such, depending on whether the plane was tracking South or
North (minimum or maximum expected BFOs, respectively,
see Sec. IV-C), bounds on the descent rate of MH370 at
the times of transmission corresponding to the last 2 BFOs
can be determined by subtracting the values given in the
rightmost column of Table III from the expected BFO values
for level flight tracking South or North, dividing the result
by 1.7 Hz and multiplying by 100 fpm. The expected BFO
for a south track is approximately 260 Hz, whilst for a
north track it is close to 280 Hz. Using these numbers, it is
straightforward to obtain the bounds shown in Table IV. Note
that the bounds have been rounded to the nearest 100 fpm.
Looking at all values in the table, it can be concluded that
irrespective of ground track angle and for assumed ground
speeds less than approximately 500 kts, under Hypothesis 1,
MH370 would have been descending at between 3,900 and
14,800 fpm at 00:19:29Z, and just 8 seconds later at between
14,800 and 25,300 fpm. These descent rates are consistent
with simulations of an uncontrolled phugoid descent reported
in [7].
B. Hypothesis 2: SATCOM outage due to some other reason
It is still of interest to determine bounds on the descent
rates under the alternate hypothesis that something else not
13Given the relatively short duration of the power-loss under Hypothesis
1, it is possible that the extent of BFO decay due to OCXO warm-up would
be less than shown for log-ons 1 to 7. This is essentially covered within
Hypothesis 2, which considers a momentary SATCOM outage.
associated with a power outage led to the SDU-initiated log-
on event at 00:19Z. In this case, the warm-up drift would not
apply. Therefore, the recorded BFOs can be treated normally
(though still subject to BFO noise). In this case, the BFO
bounds are as set out in Table V. Using these bounds, the lower
and upper descent rates can be calculated again, resulting in
the bounds presented in Table VI. It can be concluded from
the table that the recorded BFOs indicate that at 00:19:29Z the
plane was descending at between 2,900 fpm and 6,800 fpm. At
the time of the last SATCOM message, it can be concluded
under Hypothesis 2 that the descent rate would have been
between 13,800 fpm and 17,600 fpm.
C. Summary of Descent Rate Bounds
Combining the descent rate bounds for Hypotheses 1 and 2,
outer bounds can be established for the descent rate of MH370
at 00:19:29Z and 00:19:37Z. Specifically, regardless of ground
track angle and for ground speeds less than approximately
500 kts, accounting for possible BFO noise, and regardless
of whether the SATCOM outage between 00:11Z and 00:19Z
was due to an SDU power outage or another reason, the outer
bounds on the possible descent rates at the times of the last
two SATCOM messages from MH370 are given in Table VII.
D. Estimated Downwards Acceleration
When interpreting the bounds presented in Table VII, the
different conditions under which each bound was derived need
to be considered. For instance the lowest rate at 00:19:29Z was
derived assuming no period of SDU outage and a southwards
track, whereas the highest descent rate for 00:19:37Z was
derived assuming a one minute outage of the SDU with the
maximum BFO decay observed in the previous 7 SDU outage
events for 9M-MRO. Hence, it would not be reasonable to
say that the plane could have been descending at 2,900 fpm
at 00:19:29Z and 25,300 fpm 8 seconds later, which would
imply a downwards acceleration on the order of 2,800 fpm per
second. Whilst it is not possible to determine a precise accel-
eration value, a rough approximation of the average descent
rate over those 8 seconds could for instance be taken using the
mid-points of the bounds at each time, which would result in
an average downwards acceleration of 10,700 fpm in 8 seconds
or around 1,300 fpm per second, which equates to around 6.7
ms−2 or 0.68g, where g denotes Earth’s gravitational constant,
which is approximately 9.8 ms−2. It is straightforward to see
that other reasonable methods of estimating the downward
acceleration (such as taking the difference between the two
minimum descent rates or the two maximum descent rates
at 00:19:29Z and 00:19:37Z) would yield similar acceleration
values.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has discussed in detail all known factors that
could have influenced the BFOs associated with the last
two SATCOM messages received from MH370 at 00:19Z.
Lower and upper bounds on its descent rate at this time
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THE LAST TWO BFOS FOR MH370 UNDER HYPOTHESIS 1
Timestamp Recorded BFO (Hz) BFO Range if Start-Up Drift Removed (Hz) Extended Range Considering BFO Noise (Hz)
00:19:29Z 182 [46, 165] [28, 193]
00:19:37Z -2 [−132,−19] [−150, 9]
TABLE IV
MH370 DESCENT RATES AT 00:19Z 8 MARCH 2014 UNDER HYPOTHESIS 1
Timestamp Min. Desc. Rate, South Track Min. Desc. Rate, North Track Max. Desc. Rate, South Track Max. Desc. Rate, North Track
00:19:29Z 3,900 fpm 5,100 fpm 13,600 fpm 14,800 fpm
00:19:37Z 14,800 fpm 15,900 fpm 24,100 fpm 25,300 fpm
TABLE V
THE LAST TWO BFOS FOR MH370 UNDER HYPOTHESIS 2
Timestamp Recorded BFO (Hz) BFO Bounds With Noise (Hz)
00:19:29Z 182 [164, 210]
00:19:37Z -2 [−20, 26]
were then derived.14 The downwards acceleration over the
8 second interval between these two messages was found to
be approximately 0.68g. The derived bounds and approximate
downwards acceleration rate are consistent with simulations
of an uncontrolled descent near the 7th arc as reported in [7].
This suggests that 9M-MRO should lie relatively close to the
7th BTO arc.
At the time of submission of this paper, MH370 had not
been located. The search was in indefinite suspension pending
‘credible new evidence pointing to a specific location for the
plane’. Further efforts in data analysis and in drift modeling of
located MH370 debris have been conducted and reported (e.g.
[9], [10], [7]). Note that the descent analysis from this paper
was used in [7] when considering the width of any potential
future search area. Some recent news reports have suggested
a US underwater exploration firm named Ocean Infinity may
soon be launching a renewed search effort for MH370. The
reader should refer to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau
website [11] and the general media for updates.
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TABLE VI
MH370 DESCENT RATES AT 00:19Z 8 MARCH 2014 UNDER HYPOTHESIS 2
Timestamp Min. Desc. Rate, South Track Min. Desc. Rate, North Track Max. Desc. Rate, South Track Max. Desc. Rate, North Track
00:19:29Z 2,900 fpm 4,100 fpm 5,600 fpm 6,800 fpm
00:19:37Z 13,800 fpm 14,900 fpm 16,500 fpm 17,600 fpm
TABLE VII
RANGE OF POSSIBLE MH370 DESCENT RATES AT 00:19Z 8 MARCH 2014
Timestamp Min. Desc. Rate Max. Desc. Rate
00:19:29Z 2,900 fpm 14,800 fpm
00:19:37Z 13,800 fpm 25,300 fpm
